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Abstract
We analyze the exploitation of an antibiotic in a market subject to open access on the part of antibiotic
producers to the common pool of antibiotic eﬃcacy and compare it to the social optimum. Demand for
the antibiotic is derived under the assumption that individuals diﬀer with respect to their valuation
of being in good health. The dynamics of the antibiotic eﬃcacy is based on an epidemiological model
which describes the dynamic interaction between the level of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic and the level of
infection in the population, including the fact that antibiotic consumption tends to deplete the eﬃcacy of
the antibiotic in combating bacterial infections as the bacteria develop resistance to the antibiotic. The
antibiotic producers care only about the variables that aﬀect the instantaneous demand for the drug,
namely the current stock of infected population and the current level of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic, and
enter the market until price is driven down to average cost. The social optimum, on the other hand,
takes into account the welfare of the entire population, including that portion of the population which
is in good health and that which is infected but chooses not to consume the antibiotic, as well as the
eﬀect of the current treatment rate on the future eﬃcacy of the treatment and the future stock of infected
population. We show that depending on the parameters of the model, in particular the cost of production
and the improvement in the recovery rate that results from treatment, the positive steady-state level of
antibiotic eﬃcacy to which the system tends under open access can be lower or higher than the level
which should prevail in the socially optimal steady state. In fact there are parameter conﬁgurations for
which the steady states can be exactly the same. But no matter how the steady states compare, the
socially optimal and the open-access paths to steady state will diﬀer and involve diﬀerent paths for the
treatment rates.
Keywords: economics of antibiotic resistance, antibiotic eﬃcacy, renewable resource, open-access equi-
librium, social optimum.
Re´sume´
Nous analysons l’exploitation de l’eﬃcacite´ d’un antibiotique dans un marche´ ou` les producteurs de cet
antibiotique ont libre acce`s au stock commun d’eﬃcacite´ de l’antibiotique et nous comparons l’e´quilibre
qui en re´sulte a` l’optimum social. La fonction de demande pour l’antibiotique est de´rive´e sous l’hypothe`se
que les individus diﬀe`rent par rapport a` leur valorisation d’eˆtre en bonne sante´. L’eﬃcacite´ de l’antibio-
tique est mode´lise´e comme une ressource naturelle renouvelable exploite´e en acce`s libre. La dynamique
de l’eﬃcacite´ de l’antibiotique est base´e sur un mode`le e´pide´miologique, qui de´crit l’interaction dyna-
mique entre le niveau d’eﬃcacite´ et la population infecte´e. Il tient compte du fait que la consommation
d’antibiotique dans l’objectif de combattre les infections tend a` de´croˆıtre l’eﬃcacite´ de l’antibiotique en
raison de la se´lection naturelle de bacte´ries re´sistantes. Dans ce contexte, les producteurs d’antibiotiques
ne s’inte´ressent qu’au stock courant de la population infecte´e, ce qui de´termine la taille de leur marche´, et
au niveau courant de l’eﬃcacite´ de l’antibiotique, ce qui de´termine la volonte´ a` payer pour le me´dicament
de la part de la population malade. Ces producteurs entrent sur le marche´ jusqu’a` ce que l’e´galite´ du
prix et du couˆt moyen soit atteinte. Quant a` l’optimum social, la fonction d’objectif a` maximiser tient
compte du bien-eˆtre de la population totale, incluant la portion qui est en bonne sante´ ainsi que celle qui
est infecte´e et qui ne consomme pas l’antibiotique. Cette maximisation tient aussi explicitement compte
de l’eﬀet de la population actuelle traite´e sur les niveaux futurs d’eﬃcacite´ et de population infecte´e. Nos
re´sultats montrent qu’en fonction des parame`tres du mode`le, plus particulie`rement le couˆt de production
et l’accroissement du taux de gue´rison duˆ au traitement d’antibiotique, que le niveau positif d’eﬃcacite´
de l’antibiotique atteint a` l’e´tat stationnaire en acce`s libre peut eˆtre plus e´leve´ ou plus faible que celui
atteint en optimum social. Il existe meˆme des conﬁgurations de parame`tres pour lesquels les e´tats sta-
tionnaires co¨ıncident. Cependant, dans tous les cas, les sentiers menant vers ces e´tats stationnaires en
acce`s libre ainsi qu’en optimum social vont diﬀe´rer quant a` la proportion de la population infecte´e qui
rec¸oit un traitement.
Mots cle´s : e´conomie de la re´sistance aux antibiotiques, ressources renouvelables, e´quilibre de libre acce`s,
optimum social.
1 Introduction
It is a well established fact that antibiotic consumption tends to deplete the eﬃcacy of
many antibiotics in combating bacterial infections, as the bacteria develop resistance to the
antibiotic.1 The resulting reduction in the eﬃcacy of antibiotic treatment of many diseases
is a matter of growing concern, since it has serious consequences for public health and is the
source of important economic costs to society.2 The problem is complicated by the fact that
individual decision makers, acting in their own best interest, do not take into account the
eﬀect of their current decisions on the future eﬃcacy of the antibiotic. To realize the social
optimum in such a context would require cooperative decision making. Thus the market
outcome is unlikely to be socially optimal.
A useful way to approach this problem from an economic perspective is to think of the
eﬃcacy of the antibiotic as a common pool resource, much like ﬁsheries for instance. That is
the approach we take in this paper. More precisely, we analyze the exploitation of antibiotic
eﬃcacy in a market subject to open access on the part of the antibiotic producers to the
common pool of eﬃcacy and compare it to the social optimum.
An early contribution to the analysis of the market outcome in a context where the
eﬃcacy of a drug is declining in its use can be found in Tisdell (1982). In a highly stylized
two-period model, he ﬁnds that the market outcome under perfect competition leads to lower
eﬃcacy of the drug than would be socially optimal. Our model diﬀers considerably from
that of Tisdell in a number of ways. First, we explicitly derive the demand function for
the antibiotic under the assumption that individuals diﬀer with respect to their valuation
of being in good health. Second, we treat antibiotic eﬃcacy as a common pool renewable
resource. Third, we explicitly take into account the dynamic interaction between the level
of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic and the level of infection in the population. The underlying
1For a general overview of the problem of antibiotic resistance see Levy (2002). See also Levy and Marshall
(2004) for a recent review of the biological and epidemiological literature on the subject.
2See for instance Holmberg, Solomon and Blake (1987), Phelps (1989), US Congress, Oﬃce of Technology
Assessment (1995), Elbasha (2003) and Laxminarayan (2003).
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dynamic system that describes the evolution of the two state variables, namely the level
of antibiotic eﬃcacy and the stock of infected population, is based on an epidemiological
model (the SIS-model) borrowed from the biology literature. Fourth, the determination of
the social optimum takes into account not only the surplus accruing to the consumers of
the antibiotic, but also that of the infected individuals who choose not to buy it and that
of the individuals in good health, in addition to the surplus derived by the producers of the
antibiotic.
The antibiotic producers care only about the current stock of the infected population,
which determines market size, and the current level of antibiotic eﬃcacy, which aﬀects the
willingness to pay of the sick population. They ignore the dynamic eﬀects of their decisions.
We ﬁnd that in the open-access equilibrium, the level of antibiotic eﬃcacy tends to a positive
steady-state level in which the eﬃcacy renews itself so as to maintain the steady state. It
turns out, interestingly, that this steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy can be lower or
higher than the level which should prevail in the socially optimal steady state. This will
depend on the set of parameters of the model, such as the cost of production and the
improvement in the recovery rate that results from treatment, but also the natural recovery
rates when infected with a resistant or a susceptible bacterial strain, the rate of transmission
of the disease and the discount rate. The paths to steady state will also be diﬀerent under
open access and the social optimum and will involve diﬀerent treatment rates.
Our approach owes a lot to the papers of Laxminarayan and Brown (2001), Wilen and
Msangi (2003) and Rowthorn and Brown (2003).3 We make use of the same epidemiological
model to describe the dynamics of the antibiotic eﬃcacy and of the infected population and
their interaction. However they do not model demand and do not study the market outcome,
but concentrate their analysis on the determination of the socially optimal treatment rates.
Their objective function is also less general, since it does not take into account the welfare
3We should mention also the early contribution of Brown and Layton (1996), who model antibiotic
resistance as a dynamic externality. More recently, Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) build on an epidemiological
model that is related to the one used here (a form of the so-called SIR-model) to study the economic control
of infectious diseases.
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of all the population, whether ill or not and whether being treated or not, as we do here.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the epidemiological
model that serves as the basis for the biological dynamics that underlie both the open-access
equilibrium and the social optimum. In section 3, we derive the demand function for the
antibiotic. We characterize the open-access equilibrium in section 4 and the social optimum
in section 5. In section 6, we compare the open-access outcome to the social optimum. We
conclude in section 7.
2 The epidemiological constraints
In this section we present the basic SIS epidemiological model that describes the popula-
tion dynamics underlying both the open-access equilibrium and the social optimum. This
model assumes that the total population at time t, N(t), can be compartmentalized into the
population that is in good health but susceptible to the infection, S(t), and that which is
infected, I(t). The infected population is further partitioned into those individuals infected
with a drug-susceptible strain, Iw(t), and those infected with a drug-resistant strain, Ir(t).
Hence, at any time t, N(t) = S(t) + I(t) = S(t) + Iw(t) + Ir(t).
4
Some of the uninfected hosts will become infected through contact with the infected
population. The SIS-model assumes that the rate of addition to the infected population in
this way is given by βS(t)I(t), where β denotes the rate of transmission of the infection
between the healthy and the infected population. Some of the infected will recover. In
the absence of treatment the natural rates of recovery are rr for those infected with the
drug-resistant strain and rw for those infected with the drug-susceptible strain. If all the
infected are treated with the antibiotic, the rate of recovery of those infected with the drug-
resistant strain remains unchanged, while the rate of recovery of those infected with the
4The SIS-model is used to describe the dynamics of the population in the case of diseases where once an
infected individual recovers he becomes susceptible again, as opposed to diseases where once an individual
recovers he becomes immune (the SIR-model). These types of models were ﬁrst developed by Ross (1911)
and Kermack and McKendrick (1927) to study the spread of diseases in populations. We closely follow
the formulation of the SIS-model used by Bonhoeﬀer, Lipsitch and Levin (1997) and by Wilen and Msangi
(2003).
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drug-susceptible strain increases to rw + rf . If a fraction f ∈ [0, 1] of the infected population
is being treated with the antibiotic, the rate of recovery of those infected with the drug-
susceptible strain will be rw + frf . Hence the total infected population decreases at the rate
rrIr(t) + (rw + frw)Iw(t).
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Then, if E(t) is the new entries into the population (the births) and if the death rates
of the healthy and the infected are respectively n and m, the population dynamics can be
described by:
S˙ = E − nS − βS(Iw + Ir) + rwIw + rrIr + fIwrf (1)
I˙w = (βS −m− rw − frf )Iw (2)
I˙r = (βS −m− rr)Ir. (3)
We will henceforth assume E = n = m = 0, thus taking the total population to be
constant. With a constant population, S˙ = −I˙ and equation (1) becomes redundant, being
simply the sum of equations (2) and (3). Furthermore, we can use the fact that Ir = I − Iw
to eliminate Ir, leaving two diﬀerential equations in I and Iw. Now deﬁne w(t) = Iw(t)/I(t)
as a measure of the eﬃcacy of the antibiotic, as in Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) and
Wilen and Msangi (2003). The population dynamics can then be rewritten in terms of the
two state variables w and Iw to give:
w˙ = w(1− w)(Δr − rff) (4)
I˙ = (β(N − I)− rr)I + wI(Δr − rff) (5)
where Δr ≡ rr− rw measures what is called in the epidemiological literature the ﬁtness cost
of resistance. The expression ”ﬁtness cost” refers here to the fact that although resistance
procures the advantage of being able to survive the antibiotic treatment, this advantage
comes at a biological cost for the resistant strain when Δr > 0. This is because, with
5This type of models implicitly assumes that it is not possible to control whether the patient is infected
with the resistant or with the susceptible bacteria. This is not an unrealistic assumption when the cost of
controlling for the type of bacteria before deciding on the treatment is very high and/or the delays it imposes
are long. This seems to be very often the case in practice.
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rr > rw, the resistant strain clears at a faster rate than the susceptible strain in the absence
of treatment and hence the susceptible strain naturally ends up dominating the bacteria
population in the long-run.
When the ﬁtness cost is zero it can be seen from equation (4) that the level of eﬃcacy
of the antibiotic can never be replenished, since f ≥ 0. In that sense the eﬃcacy of the
antibiotic can then be considered a nonrenewable resource. On the other hand, if the ﬁtness
cost is positive, the level of eﬃcacy can be replenished by setting f < Δr/rf and the
eﬃcacy of the antibiotic can be considered a renewable resource. Thus the ﬁtness cost is an
important element in the analysis of antibiotic resistance. We will assume the ﬁtness cost to
be positive, although it will be fairly straightforward to derive the results for a zero ﬁtness
cost as a special case of the more general results.
There exist three steady state conﬁgurations to the population dynamics described by
(4) and (5). Let wSS and ISS denote the steady-state values of w and I respectively.
For any f = Δr/rf , we have w˙ = 0 for w = 0 or w = 1 and there are two distinct steady
states, given by:
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rr
β
, 0
)
(6)
and
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rw − rff
β
, 1
)
. (7)
For f = Δr/rf , we have w˙ = 0 for any value of w and hence all
(ISS, wSS) =
(
βN − rr
β
, w ∈ [0, 1]
)
(8)
constitute steady states. We will assume throughout βN − rr > 0 and βN − rw − rf > 0,
thus guaranteing the existence of positively valued steady states for I.
Clearly, the dynamic system described by (4) and (5) depends in an important way on the
proportion f of the population being treated. In particular, if an optimal policy happened to
require f to vary over time, then the diﬀerential equation system would be non stationary.
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Before introducing economic and policy considerations, it is useful to characterize in more
detail in (I, w)-space the dynamic behavior of the system for all possible values of f . From
(5) we verify that
dw
dI
∣∣∣∣
I˙=0
=
β
Δr − rf f , (9)
which is the slope of the isocline for I in (I, w)-space. This isocline must go through the
point (I, w) = ((βN − rr)/β, 0). It is easily veriﬁed from equation (5) that I is increasing
anywhere to the left of the isocline and it is decreasing anywhere to the right.
Consider ﬁrst the case of f ∈ [0,Δr/rf ). In that case the isocline for I is a positively
sloped straight line through (I, w) = ((βN−rr)/β, 0) and w is increasing for any w ∈ (0, 1), as
can be seen from equation (4). This is illustrated in Figure 1a, where the arrows indicate the
direction of the forces driving (I, w) over time. From any initial state the system converges to
the steady state ((βN − rw− rff)/β, 1). Thus, with a relatively low and constant treatment
rate the drug-susceptible bacteria will dominate the bacterial population and the eﬃcacy of
the antibiotic will be fully replenished in the long-run. This case includes the case where
there is absence of treatment (f = 0) and can serve to illustrate the concept of ﬁtness cost.
Indeed, it is now immediate that if f = 0, then Δr = rr−rw > 0 implies that the susceptible
strain will dominate in the long-run.
Figure 1b illustrates the position of the I˙ = 0 isocline for two diﬀerent values of f <
Δr/rf . As f is increased from f1 to f2 > f1, the I˙ = 0 isocline pivots to the left through
the point (I, w) = ((βN − rr)/β, 0). As a consequence the long-run equilibrium will feature
a lower steady-state level of infection when a higher (constant) fraction of the infected
population is treated.
Consider now the case of f ∈ (Δr/rf , 1], which is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case the
isocline for I˙ = 0 is a negatively sloped straight line through (I, w) = ((βN − rr)/β, 0) and
w is decreasing for any w ∈ (0, 1), as indicated by the direction of the arrows in Figure 2.
Therefore from any initial state the system converges to the steady state ((βN − rr)/β, 0)
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and the resistant strain ends up dominating the bacterial population in the long-run.6
There remains the case of f = Δr/rf . In that case, the I˙ = 0 isocline is the vertical line
going through (I, w) = ((βN−rr)/β, 0), as illustrated in Figure 3. Any point on this vertical
line is then a steady state, since the rate of treatment exactly compensates the ﬁtness cost
eﬀect so as to keep the eﬃcacy of the antibiotic stationary, no matter what its level. Hence if
the treatment rate is ﬁxed at Δr/rf , the system will move horizontally to a stationary point
on the I isocline which will depend strictly on the initial level of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic.
Thus far our analysis has been purely descriptive, in the sense that we have limited our
attention to the purely biological aspects of the population dynamics, without considering
how the treatment rate is determined. We now turn to the introduction of economic factors,
beginning with the demand for antibiotics, which will allow us to characterize both the open-
access equilibrium and the socially optimum uses of the antibiotic, subject to the biological
constraints just described.
3 The demand for antibiotics
Let θ represent an individual’s valuation of being in good health, with θ being distributed
over the total population N with distribution function F (θ). When infected, this individual
can choose whether or not to buy the antibiotic at price p.7 It is assumed that the individual
knows whether he is infected or not but, when infected, cannot tell whether he is infected
with the drug-resistant or the drug-susceptible strain of the bacteria.
When an individual is infected, the probability of being infected with a drug-resistant
strain is given by Ir
I
= 1 − w, in which case the recovery rate is rr whether he takes the
6As in the case of f ∈ [0,Δr/rf ), the I˙ = 0 isocline will pivot to the left through the point (I, w) =
((βN − rr)/β, 0) if f is increased. In this case however the long-run steady state is independent of f since
only the resistant strain remains in equilibrium and the level of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic is driven to zero.
7Our approach to the derivation of demand begs the important question of the doctor-patient relationship,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Actually, it is the doctor who prescribes the antibiotic to the patient.
The patient then decides whether to purchase the antibiotic or not. So the demand function for the antibiotic
should probably take into account the doctor’s decision rule as to whether or not to prescribe the antibiotic
as well as the patient’s decision process. Introducing the doctor’s decision rule would make it possible to
address the issue of the doctor’s awareness of the dynamic eﬀects of antibiotic consumption on the eﬃcacy
of antibiotic and its social welfare implications.
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antibiotic or not. On the other hand, there is a probability Iw
I
= w of being infected with
the drug-susceptible strain, in which case he can expect to recover at the rate rw. Therefore
the expected recovery rate without treatment is:
π(w) = wrw + (1− w)rr.
If the infected individual buys the antibiotic, he increases his chances of recovery only if the
bacterial strain he is suﬀering from is susceptible to treatment. His expected recovery rate
is then increased only by rfw when he buys the antibiotic, since there is a 1−w chance that
the bacteria is resistant. The utility derived from health considerations by the individual of
type θ will therefore be given by:
u(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
θ if in good health
π(w)θ if infected and not taking the antibiotic
π(w) + rfw]θ if infected and taking the antibiotic.
Denote by θ˜ the individual type who is indiﬀerent between buying the antibiotic or not
when infected. The value of θ˜ is determined by:
π(w)θ˜ = [π(w) + rfw]θ˜ − p
which means that
θ˜ =
p
rfw
. (10)
Individuals with θ ≥ θ˜ will thus buy the antibiotic and those with θ < θ˜ will not. If the whole
population N were infected, the proportion of individuals willing to buy the antibiotic would
be [1−F (θ˜)]. But this is not the case: uninfected individuals will not buy the antibiotic. We
will assume that the infection spreads equally over the population N , so that being infected
and having a certain valuation θ are independent events. Then the fraction of the infected
population willing to buy the antibiotic is given by
I
N
[
1− F
(
θ˜
)]
and, since individuals
9
have a unitary demand, total demand will be:8
Q = N
I
N
[
1− F
(
θ˜
)]
= I
[
1− F
(
p
rfw
)]
.
Therefore the inverse demand function is:
P
(
Q
I
,w
)
= rfwF
−1
(
1− Q
I
)
. (11)
For simplicity, let us assume that θ is distributed uniformly over the population, with
supports [0, 1]. The inverse demand function then becomes:
P
(
Q
I
,w
)
= rfw
(
1− Q
I
)
. (12)
Notice that the intercept of the inverse demand function is rfw and its slope is rfw/I.
The variable w can be viewed as an (endogenous) index of the quality of the drug, which
can vary between zero and one. For w = 0, demand is identically zero. For a given size
of the infected population, I, the inverse demand curve pivots upwards through the point
(Q, p) = (I, 0) as the quality of the antibiotic increases from zero to one and demand is at
its highest when w = 1.
Because of unitary demand, Q/I represents the fraction of the infected population treated
and is thus equal to the parameter f in the dynamic constraints (4) and (5). The inverse
demand function can therefore be rewritten as a function of the fraction of the infected
population being treated and the eﬃcacy of the antibiotic to give:
P (f, w) = rfw (1− f) . (13)
4 Open-access equilibrium
In a regime where there is open access to the stock of antibiotic eﬃcacy, antibiotic producers
will enter until, at equilibrium, price equals average production costs, thus dissipating any
8Deﬁne the joint probability of an individual i being infected and having a valuation of good health
higher than θ˜ as Pr(i = infected, θi ≥ θ˜). Then, by independence, we have Pr(i = infected, θi ≥ θ˜) = Pr(i =
infected)Pr(θi ≥ θ˜) = IN
[
1− F
(
p
rfw
)]
.
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rent that might be had on the common pool of antibiotic eﬃcacy. We will assume that the
antibiotic producers are identical, each having a constant unit cost of production of c > 0.
If Q(t) is the total industry production and sales of the antibiotic under open access, then
the open-access equilibrium is characterized by:
P
(
Q(t)
I
, w
)
= c. (14)
Substituting for the inverse demand function (12) derived above and assuming w = 0, we
ﬁnd that:
Q(t) = I(t)
(
1− c
rfw(t)
)
, (15)
or:
f(t) =
Q(t)
I(t)
= 1− c
rfw(t)
. (16)
Hence, under open access, antibiotic production is economically viable and the fraction of
the infected population treated will be positive at any date t if and only if rfw(t) > c. Note
that since w(t) ≤ 1, this requires rf > c.
We can now ﬁrst characterize the diﬀerent steady states under open-access equilibrium,
before turning to the analysis of the transition to a steady state from diﬀerent possible initial
conditions.
4.1 The steady states under open access
Consider ﬁrst the epidemiological steady state given by (6). Since the eﬃcacy of the treat-
ment is driven down to zero in this steady state (w = 0), so is demand. Any positive
production would lead to losses, so that the equilibrium output of the antibiotic will be zero
(QSS = 0) and nobody gets treated. This steady state would therefore be characterized in
open access by:
(fSS, ISS, wSS) =
(
0,
βN − rr
β
, 0
)
. (17)
However, from (13) we know that with w = 0, P (f, w) = 0. Therefore, since c > 0, the
equilibrium condition (14) cannot hold and such a steady state is ruled out in open access.
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In the epidemiological steady state given by (7), the quality of the drug is maximal
(w = 1). Therefore, from (16), f = 1 − c/rf and this steady state will be characterized in
open access by:
(fSS, ISS, wSS) =
(
1− c
rf
,
βN − rw − rf + c
β
, 1
)
. (18)
The steady-state antibiotic production will in this case be
QSS =
(
1− c
rf
)(
βN − rw − rf + c
β
)
.
Finally, steady states which satisfy (8) occur only when f = Δr/rf and are compatible
with any value of w ∈ [0, 1] in the epidemiological model. But, from (16), we see that
f = Δr/rf can be the open-access equilibrium treatment rate only if
Δr
rf
= 1− c
rfw(t)
. (19)
This means that w must take on the unique value that satisﬁes (19) in order for the system
to be in such a steady state under open access. Hence there is a unique steady state of this
type in open access, given by:
(fSS, ISS, wSS) =
(
Δr
rf
,
βN − rr
β
,
c
rf −Δr
)
. (20)
In this steady state the aggregate antibiotic production will be
QSS =
βN − rr
β
(
1− rf −Δr
rf
)
.
Notice that the steady-state conﬁgurations (18) and (20) are mutually exclusive. Which
one is relevant will depend on the values of the parameters. To be more precise, if c = rf−Δr,
they are indistinguishable and wSS = 1. If c < rf − Δr, then (20) must be the relevant
steady-state conﬁguration, since this is incompatible with (16) when evaluated at wSS = 1.
If c > rf −Δr then (18) must be the relevant steady-state conﬁguration, since it must then
be the case that wSS = 1 and fSS = 1− c/rf < Δr/rf .
Notice also that if c = rf−Δr then c < rf and therefore fSS > 0. Furthermore, if c ≥ rf ,
then c > rf −Δr, which means that wSS = 1 and hence fSS = 0.
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4.2 The transition to steady state under open access
At time t = 0, a stock of infected population I(0) = I0 ∈ (0, N ] and a stock of eﬃcacy
w(0) = w0 ∈ (0, 1) are inherited. The initial state is therefore interior, except for possibly
I = N .9 As long as w > c/rf , the antibiotic production is economically viable and the ﬁrms
will enter and produce a positive amount of the antibiotic.
Consider ﬁrst the case where c ≤ rf −Δr. From the initial state (I0, w0) the open-access
equilibrium will then converge asymptotically to the steady state deﬁned in (20). To see this,
distinguish between four types of states, according as to whether I lies in (I, w)-space to the
left or to the right of the I˙ = 0 isocline and w is greater or smaller than wSS. Let I and
II denote states for which w > wSS and III and IV denote states for which w < wSS, with
states of type I and III lying to the left of the I˙ = 0 isocline and those of type II and IV to
its right. We know from the open-access equilibrium condition (16) that f = 1− c/rfw and
that in the steady state given by (20), wSS = c/(rf −Δr). Therefore w  wSS is equivalent
to f  Δr/rf in equilibrium.
We have seen in Section 2 that for states of types I and II the I˙ = 0 isoclines will be
negatively sloped and that w will be decreasing over time. As for the stock of infected
population, I, it will be increasing over time when to the left of the isocline and decreasing
when to the right. We are therefore in a situation such as the one depicted in Figure 2 for
a ﬁxed f > Δr/rf . However, in open access, as the equilibrium quality of the antibiotic
decreases so will the demand for it and, consequently, the fraction of the infected population
treated. But since the I˙ = 0 isocline is not independent of f , this means that the system is
non stationary: the I˙ = 0 isocline will pivot over time towards the right through the point
9We explicitly ignore the trivial case of I0 = 0, in which case the population remains healthy forever
according to equation (5). We thereby implicitly assume that some exogenous event occurs initially which
causes a portion of the population to become infected by the bacteria. We also assume that a portion of
the initially infected population suﬀers from the resistant strain and a portion suﬀers from the susceptible
strain, so that Iw(0) and Ir(0) are both strictly positive. It then follows that w0(= Iw(0)/I(0)) is strictly
between zero and one. If we had w0 = 0 (everyone is initially infected with the resistant strain) or w0 = 1
(no one is initially infected with the resistant strain), then w remains constant (see equation (4)) and the
system would converge to either the steady state deﬁned in (17) if w0 = 0 or in (18) if w0 = 1.
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((βN − rr)/β, 0), as can be seen from equation (9).
Consider then an initial state (I0, w0) with an infected population that is relatively low
and an antibiotic eﬃcacy relatively high, so that it belongs to type I. Then the dynamics
will be as depicted in Figure 4a. Over time, w decreases and I increases, while the I˙ = 0
isocline continuously pivots toward the vertical line through ((βN − rr)/β, 0). At the time
at which the (I(t), w(t))-path crosses the isocline corresponding to f(0) = c/rfw0, say at
t = t1 > 0, the isocline corresponding to f(t1) = c/rfw(t1) will be further to the right of the
initial isocline, as is illustrated in Figure 4a. The state therefore remains of type I and the
path is still decreasing over time. The state will in this way converge asymptotically to the
steady state deﬁned in (20), as f(t) converges to Δr/rf and the isocline converges to the
vertical line through ((βN − rr)/β, 0).
The situation is diﬀerent when the initial state is characterized by suﬃciently high values
of both the eﬃcacy of the antibiotic and the stock of infected population, so as to be of
type II, with, as for type I, f(t) > Δr/rf . Then, at ﬁrst, both I and w will be decreasing as
will be f . As for type I the isocline is negatively sloped and it is pivoting towards the right
as f falls. But this means that at some time, say t = t1, the (I(t), w(t))-path will hit the
isocline corresponding to f(t1). At that date, the system switches to the regime in which
the state is of type I and I(t) goes from decreasing to increasing. The state again converges
in the same way to the steady state deﬁned in (20). Such a case is illustrated in Figure 4b.
A pattern that is in some way similar will occur if the initial state happens to be of
type III, with still a relatively high stock of infected population, but now a relatively low level
of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic. This is illustrated in Figure 5a. In this case, since f(t) < Δr/rf ,
w is increasing (see (4)) and the I˙ = 0 isocline is positively sloped and pivoting towards
the left as f increases with w (see (9)). For any state of this type, both I and w will be
increasing along the equilibrium path. But since the isocline is pivoting towards the left,
this means that the state trajectory must, at say t = t1, hit the isocline corresponding to
f(t1). When this occurs, it must be the case that I(t1) > I
SS, since the isocline is positively
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sloped. At that point, there is a switch to a regime in which the state is of type IV, as the
stock of infected population goes from increasing to decreasing, and the isocline continues
to pivot towards the vertical line through ((βN − rr)/β, 0).
For any initial state of type IV, the dynamic forces will be pushing w up and I down and
f will be increasing with w. The state converges in this way to the steady state deﬁned in
(20), as the isocline simultaneously converges to the vertical line through ((βN − rr)/β, 0).
This is the case illustrated in Figure 5b.
Figure 6 summarizes these long-run outcomes for the four types of initial states. In all
cases, there is convergence to the same steady state, with fSS = Δr/rf , I
SS = (βN − rr)/β
and wSS = c/(rf − Δr). When beginning from initial states of type I and IV, the state
converges directly to this steady state. When beginning from initial states of type II or
III, there is a form of overshooting, in the sense that the stock of infected population moves
beyond its steady-state level before, at some point, reversing its direction to converge to that
steady state. For an initial state of type II, I is initially higher than ISS, then falls below
it before eventually beginning to increase in order to reach ISS again in the long-run. For a
type IV initial state, I is initially lower than its steady-state level, moves beyond it and, at
some point, begins to decrease towards it in order reach it in the long-run.
To see why the overshooting occurs when the initial state is characterized by either
relatively high antibiotic eﬃcacy and high stock of infected population (type II) or relatively
low antibiotic eﬃcacy and low stock of infected population (type III), divide both sides of
(4) by 1− w and both sides of (5) by I, and subtract one from the other to get:
I˙
I
− w˙
1− w = β[I
SS − I], (21)
where ISS = (βN − rr)/β, the long-run stationary stock of infected population.
We immediately see that if the initial state is of either type I or type IV, both sides of
this equation are of the same sign, since I and w are initially moving in opposite directions.
This will remain so until the steady-state is reached, at which point we have I˙ = w˙ = 0 and
I = ISS. There can be no overshooting in those cases.
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On the other hand, if the initial states are of either type II or type III, then I and w are
initially moving in the same direction, with
[
I˙
I
− w˙
1−w
]
being initially negative if of type II
and positive if of type III and, in both cases, tending to zero over time as I tends to ISS. The
left-hand side will go through zero and change sign when I ﬁrst reaches ISS, with I˙
I
= w˙
1−w .
At that point, I and w will both still be moving in the same direction. But the isocline is
pivoting in the direction opposite to the movement of I. Therefore I will eventually have to
change direction, since it must at some point cross the I˙ isocline.
Consider for example the case of an initial state of type II. Since the antibiotic is very
eﬀective and the stock of infected population is high, demand for the antibiotic is high and
a large fraction of the infected population gets treated. As a result, both I and w will be
decreasing initially. At some point I will reach ISS, but with still w > wSS. At that time,
I and w are still decreasing, the state still being of type II since the I˙-isocline is negatively
sloped.10 But the isocline is pivoting towards the right as the treatment rate decreases and
I will eventually have to hit it, after which point I begins to increase, the state having
become of type I. We will from that point on have I increasing and w decreasing, until the
steady state is reached. While all this is occurring, the treatment rate has been continuously
decreasing (see (16)), until it also reaches its steady state value of fSS = Δr/rf . The same
type of reasoning applies when the initial state is of type III.
Notice that if c = rf − Δr, then the initial states are necessarily either of type III
or type IV. The dynamics is as described above for initial states of those types, with the
particularity that the steady state is characterized by wSS = 1. As already noted in the
previous section, if c = rf −Δr then c < rf and therefore fSS > 0.
If the endogenous quality of the drug was initially lower than the economically viable
level, that is if w < c/rf , then no antibiotic is produced and the fraction treated is initially
zero. But with f = 0, w will be increasing. As for I, it will be increasing if of type III (the
case illustrated in Figure 6) and decreasing if of type IV. Therefore in both cases the state
10This can be seen by setting I˙ = 0 in (5) and remembering that f > Δr/rf when the state is either of
type II or type I.
16
will eventually reach a point where production becomes proﬁtable and producers enter.
We have so far been considering the case where c ≤ rf − Δr, so that the steady state
is as deﬁned in (20). Consider now the case where c > rf − Δr. Production cost is then
relatively high and, as was the case for c = rf − Δr, f < Δr/rf , so that initial states are
necessarily of either type III or type IV. The corresponding dynamics will be as described
above for those types of states, except for the fact that the level of antibiotic eﬃcacy will now
attain w = 1 before the stock of infected population can reach the level I = (βN − rr)/β.
The relevant steady state conﬁguration is then that given by (18), with wSS = 1 and ISS =
(βN − rw− rf + c)/β > (βN − rr)/β. Because of the relatively high cost, the treatment rate
will be relatively low. In particular, if c ≥ rf , which implies c > rf − Δr, the open-access
steady state will be of this type, but with fSS = 0, as well as f = 0 all along the path
leading to it.
5 The social optimum
The instantaneous social welfare is given by the sum of the surplus of all consumers, whether
or not they are infected and, when infected, whether or not they buy the antibiotic, and the
surplus of the antibiotic producers. It can be written as:
W (f, w, I)
= N
∫ 1
0
u(θ)dθ − cfI
= (N − I)
∫ 1
0
θdθ + I
∫ θ˜(p)
0
π(w)θ dθ + I
∫ 1
θ˜(p)
{[π(w) + rfw]θ − p} dθ + [p− c]fI
=
1
2
(N − I) + 1
2
π(w)I +
1
2
rfwIf
2 + [rfw(1− f)− c]fI, (22)
where p = P (f, w) = rfw(1 − f) is the price of the antibiotic and, exactly as in (10),
θ˜(p) = P (f(t),w)
rfw
= (1 − f) deﬁnes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying or not
buying the antibiotic.
The ﬁrst of those four terms is the surplus derived by that portion of the population
which is in good health, θ = 1/2 being the mean valuation of good health. The second term
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is the surplus accruing to that portion of the infected population which values good health
at less than θ˜(p) and hence chooses not to buy the antibiotic. They recover at the natural
recovery rate π(w). The third term is the surplus that accrues to those who choose to buy
the treatment at price p, since they have a valuation of good health higher than θ˜(p). They
recover at the augmented rate π(w) + rfw. The last term is the surplus of the producers of
the antibiotic.
Determining the social optimum means choosing the path of f(t) so as to maximize:
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtW (f(t), w(t), I(t))dt (23)
subject to the diﬀerential equations (4) and (5), which determine the evolution of the state
variables w(t) and I(t), and to 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. The given initial conditions are w(0) = w0 and
I(0) = I0 where, by assumption, w0 ∈ (0, 1) and I0 ∈ (0, N ] (see footnote 9).11
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is given by:
H(f, w, I, μ, λ) =
1
2
(N − I) + 1
2
π(w)I + rfwfI − 1
2
rfwIf
2 − cfI
+μw(1− w)(Δr − rff) + λI[(β(N − I)− rr + w(Δr − rff)] (24)
and its derivative with respect to the control variable f is:
∂H
∂f
= [rfw(1− f ∗)− c] I − rfw [μ(1− w) + λI] , (25)
where μ and λ are the shadow values associated to the level of antibiotic eﬃcacy and to the
stock of infected population respectively.
The following conditions, as well as (4) and (5), are necessary for an optimum:
∂H
∂f
≤ 0, ∂H
∂f
f = 0, f ≥ 0 or ∂H
∂f
≥ 0, ∂H
∂f
(1− f) = 0, f ≤ 1 (26)
11The state variables are also constrained, since we must have w(t) ∈ [0, 1] and I(t) ∈ [0, N ]. We neglect
those constraints, since, if w(t) reaches either 1 or 0, it will stay there forever. As for I(t), for any interior
value to the left of the I˙ = 0 isocline, the dynamic forces always push it away from 0, and, for any value to
the right of the I˙ = 0 isocline, including I = N , those forces always push it away from N . See the discussion
of the epidemiological dynamics of Section 2.
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ρμ− μ˙ = rffI − 1
2
rff
2I − 1
2
ΔrI + (Δr − rff)[μ(1− 2w) + λI] (27)
ρλ− λ˙ = rfwf − 1
2
rfwf
2 − cf − 1
2
(1− π(w))
+λ[β(N − 2I)− rr + w(Δr − rff)]. (28)
Condition (26) is the ﬁrst-order condition for the maximization of the Hamiltonian with
respect to f(t) at each t. Conditions (27) and (28) are the arbitrage equations that determine
the evolution of μ(t) and λ(t).
In the case of an interior solution for f , condition (26) can be written:
rfw(1− f) = c + rfw
I
[μ(1− w) + λI] . (29)
The left-hand side of this equation is the price of the antibiotic. The condition says that
the price of the antibiotic must be equal to the full marginal cost of treatment, which is
the sum of the marginal cost of producing the antibiotic, c, and the marginal opportunity
cost — through its eﬀect on both the quality of the antibiotic, w, and the stock of infected
population, I, — of using it to treat a fraction f of the infected population.
The variable μ measures the marginal shadow price of antibiotic eﬃcacy. The variable
w(= Iw/I) being the level of antibiotic eﬃcacy, its complement, 1−w(= Ir/I), measures the
level of antibiotic resistance. Hence μ(1−w) evaluates the level of antibiotic resistance at the
marginal shadow price μ. The variable λ measures the marginal shadow cost of infection.12
Hence λI is the implicit (negative) value of the stock of infected population, evaluated at
λ. The sum of those two terms, [μ(1− w) + λI], can be either positive or negative and can
possibly change sign over time. When positive (negative), the overall net opportunity cost
— in excess of the marginal cost of production c —, of marginally increasing the fraction
of the infected population treated is positive (negative). The socially optimal price of the
antibiotic at that date will then be higher (lower) than the marginal cost of production.
Contrary to the competitive producers in an open-access regime, the socially optimal
solution takes into account the fact that the current treatment decision aﬀects both the
12Numerical simulations indicate that λ is indeed negative, as expected, whereas μ is positive.
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future level of eﬃcacy of the antibiotic and the future stock of infected population. This is
reﬂected in the expression [μ(1 − w) + λI] and its sign. In open access the producers act
myopically and enter until price is driven to average cost. As shown in Section 4, this means
that f = 1 − c/rfw in equilibrium.13 If we now denote by an asterisk the socially optimal
values of the variables, then, using (29), we can write, for any t:
f(t)− f ∗(t) =
(
w(t)− w∗(t)
rfw(t)w∗(t)
)
c +
1
I∗(t)
[μ∗(t)(1− w∗(t)) + λ∗(t)I∗(t)] . (30)
We see that for identical levels of antibiotic eﬃcacy — for instance at t = 0 —, the fraction
treated under open access will be greater than is socially optimal if [μ(1−w) > −λI], since
the full social cost of treatment then exceeds the cost of producing the antibiotic. The reverse
is true if [μ(1− w) < −λI].
5.1 The steady states in the social optimum
Setting w˙ = I˙ = μ˙ = λ˙ = 0 generates a socially optimal steady state. Consider ﬁrst the
epidemiological steady state given by (6). The antibiotic is completely ineﬃcient in this
steady state (w = 0). Therefore no socially valuable production can take place and the
steady state of this type at the social optimum is:
(fSS
∗
, ISS
∗
, wSS
∗
) =
(
0,
βN − rr
β
, 0
)
. (31)
This steady state turns out to be unstable so that, when starting from an initial state (I0, w0)
which is interior, the system will move away from it.14 We can therefore ignore it in what
follows.
In the epidemiological steady state given by (7), antibiotic eﬃcacy is at its maximum
level (w = 1). Setting w = 1 in (26), in (5) with I˙ = 0 and in (28) with λ˙ = 0 yields
three equations in I, λ and f whose solution for those three variables will depend strictly on
13Marginal cost is what matters for the determination of the social optimal price, whereas average cost is
what matters in the determination of the open-access equilibrium price. Because of our assumption that the
unit cost of production is constant, we have marginal cost equal to average cost.
14Linearizing the system of diﬀerential equations (4), (5), (27) and (28) with f satisfying (26), it is veriﬁed
that the trace of the matrix of the linearized system is positive when evaluated at this steady state.
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the parameters of the problem. This is shown in the Appendix, where it is also shown that
any f ∈ [0, 1] can be part of the solution to those equations given appropriate values of the
parameters. The socially optimal fraction of the sick population treated at this steady state
will therefore depend on the parameters of the model and can take on any value from zero
to one. This means that when this is the relevant steady state conﬁguration, we will have:
(fSS
∗
, ISS
∗
, wSS
∗
) =
(
f ∈ [0, 1], βN − rw − rff
β
, 1
)
(32)
Finally, the relevant description of the steady state can be of the type characterized by
(8). This steady state is shown in the Appendix to be given by:
(fSS
∗
, ISS
∗
, wSS
∗
) =
⎛
⎝Δr
rf
,
βN − rr
β
,− J
2H
+
√(
J
2H
)2
− K
H
⎞
⎠ (33)
where
H = (rf −Δr)Δr(rr − βN)
2ρ
J = (rf −Δr)(ρ + βN − rr)
(
Δr
2ρ
− 1
)
+
rf
2
(rr − 1)− cΔr
K = c(ρ + βN − rr).
The steady state conﬁgurations (33) and (32) are mutually exclusive. In fact, when
wSS
∗
= 1 in (33) they are indistinguishable. This will occur when (see the Appendix):
c = c˜(rf ) =
Δr
[
Δr
2
− (βN − rr + ρ)
]
βN − rr + ρ−Δr +
(
βN − rr + ρ + 12 − 12(Δr + rr)
βN − rr + ρ−Δr
)
rf . (34)
For c ≤ c˜(rf ), the socially optimal steady state will be as deﬁned in (33). For c > c˜(rf ), it
will be as deﬁned in (32).
Notice also that in order to have wSS
∗
= 0 in (33), it must be the case that K = 0. But
this is not possible, since c > 0. Therefore the socially optimal level of antibiotic eﬃcacy
will be strictly positive.
As shown in the Appendix, when wSS
∗
= 1, we must have:
f
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if c <
(
1 +
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
rf
= 0 if c >
(
1 +
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
rf > rf .
(35)
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5.2 The transition to steady state in the social optimum
The social planner takes into account the full marginal cost of treatment, which reﬂects
the shadow values attached to the eﬃcacy of the drug and to the infected population in
addition to the unit cost of production. Because of this it is not the case that w  wSS∗
corresponds to f  Δr/rf , as it was in the open-access equilibrium. The deﬁnitions of the
four types of state introduced in Section 4.2 are still valid after replacing wSS by wSS
∗
, but
they cannot be expressed in terms of f being greater or smaller than Δr/rf anymore. This
means that the direction of movement of w may change as f goes from, say, f > Δr/rf
to f < Δr/rf although the state remains of the same type. It therefore becomes much
more complicated to fully describe analytically the dynamic forces within each type of state,
which themselves depend on the parameters and on the initial state. For this reason, we
rely on numerical simulations to explore the transition to steady state.15 We report here,
for illustrative purposes, simulations for a set of parameters such that c < c˜(rf ), so that the
steady state is as deﬁned in (33). The simulations show that the system converges to this
steady state when beginning from an initial state which satisﬁes I ∈ (0, N ] and w ∈ (0, 1).
Similar simulations have been carried out for the case of c > c˜(rf ), with similar results.
Recall that in this last case, the states can only be of either type III or type IV.
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of (I, w) beginning from the four possible types of initial
states, each with the same properties as in the corresponding Figure 6 for the open-access
equilibrium:16 one with the initial state to the left of the I˙ = 0 isocline (type I) and one to
its right (type II), both with w0 > w
SS∗ ; one with the initial state to the left of the isocline
15For simulations purposes, the continuous time and continuous variables problem was approximated
by a discrete time and a discrete variables problem. The numerical simulations were then performed by
formulating the optimal control problem in a recursive way. We used the value function iteration procedure
(see Judd (1998), pages 412–413) to determine the value function V that satisﬁes the Bellman equation
corresponding to the recursive formulation. The simulations were run with numerous parameter sets in order
to verify the robustness of the results. We also veriﬁed that the steady-state results obtained numerically
for the state, co-state and control variables correspond to those obtained analytically. In particular, we have
made sure that the co-state variables μ and λ satisfy μ = ∂V/∂w and λ = ∂V/∂I at the steady state.
16The simulations represented in Figure 7 were run with the following parameter values: β = 0.6, rr =
0.25, rw = 0.15, rf = 0.3, N = 1, c = 0.1, δ = 0.971, where δ represents the time discrete discount factor.
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(type III) and one to its right (type IV), both with w0 < w
SS.17
As with the open-access equilibrium, the system tends in the long-run to a steady state
in which the treatment rate is such that antibiotic eﬃcacy renews itself in order to maintain
its steady state level. The steady-state stock of infected population ((βN − rr)/β) and the
steady-state treatment rate (Δr/rf ) will be the same as in the open-access equilibrium. The
steady-state quality of the antibiotic will in general be diﬀerent, although it is conceivable
that it be the same as well. But in all cases, the approach to the steady state will diﬀer.
6 Comparing the socially optimal and the open-access steady states
Whether the steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy in the social optimum is higher or lower
than in the open-access regime depends crucially on the values of the parameters. In what
follows we concentrate on the parameters rf and c, which measure respectively the increase in
the recovery rate resulting from treatment and the unit cost of production of the antibiotic.
Equating the steady-state values for w in (20) and (33), we ﬁnd that we will have wSS
∗
=
wSS for:
c = −Δr(βN − rr + ρ)
βN − rr + 2ρ +
(
Δr(βN − rr + ρ) + ρ(rr − 1)
Δr(βN − rr + 2ρ)
)
rf . (36)
This is a straight line in (rf , c) space. Its intercept is negative and the sign of its slope
depends on the sign of Δr(βN − rr + ρ)+ ρ(rr − 1).18 For any point above that line, we will
have wSS
∗ ≤ wSS (with strict inequality as long as wSS∗ < 1), while for any point below it
we have wSS
∗
> wSS. Thus for any given value of rf , if the cost of producing the antibiotic
is suﬃciently large, the open-access equilibrium will result in a higher steady-state level of
antibiotic eﬃcacy than is socially optimal. In fact, if the slope of this line is negative, this
will always be the case. On the other hand, when the slope is positive, there will exist some
17The case where the initial state is of type III in Figure 7 illustrates a situation where w˙ goes from
negative to positive while the state (I, w) remains of type III. This is because the optimal treatment rate is
initially greater that Δr/rf but decreasing. When it reaches Δr/rf it continues to decrease for some time
before beginning to increase again to reach f = Δr/rf at the steady state. But as f goes from greater to
smaller than Δr/rf , w goes from decreasing to increasing and moves over time towards its steady state level
wSS
∗
.
18Recall that βN−rr was assumed positive from the outset, in order to guarantee the existence of positive
steady states.
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values of rf such that for a low enough cost of production the social optimum will require a
higher steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy than what would result in open-access. This
is the case represented in Figure 8, where condition (36) is drawn as a solid line. Notice
that the slope will be positive for ρ suﬃciently small and it will be positive for any ρ if
Δr > 1− rr.
From the analysis of the open-access steady state in section 4, we know that for c ≥
rf − Δr we will have wSS = 1. The condition c = rf − Δr is drawn as a dashed line in
Figure 8. This line will always lie above the line representing wSS
∗
= wSS in the positive
quadrant. For points on it, the open-access steady-state conﬁgurations (18) and (20) are
indistinguishable. For points above it, the open-access steady state is as deﬁned in (18),
with wSS = 1 and ISS = (βN − rw− rf + c)/β > (βN − rr)/β. The open-access steady state
has fSS > 0 for points between the line c = rf − Δr and the forty-ﬁve degree line c = rf ,
but fSS = 0 for points above the line c = rf .
Also depicted in Figure 8 is the straight line deﬁned by c = c˜(rf ). For points on it w
SS∗ =
1 and the socially optimal steady-state conﬁgurations (33) and (32) are indistinguishable.
For points above it, we have wSS
∗
= 1 but with ISS
∗
= (βN − rw − rff)/β > (βN − rr)β
as in the socially optimal steady-state conﬁguration (32). As can be seen from (35), when
wSS
∗
= 1 and
rf < c <
(
1 +
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
rf ,
the socially optimal rate of treatment will be positive, whereas the ﬁrms would ﬁnd it
unproﬁtable to produce the drug in open-access equilibrium and hence the treatment rate
would be zero. This steady-state threshold level of social proﬁtability is higher than is the
threshold level of private proﬁtability, since the socially optimal solution takes into account
the welfare of the whole population and the epidemiological dynamics, contrary to the ﬁrms
in open access.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 9a depicts numerical simulations that compare the tran-
sitions to steady state for a case where the initial state (I0, w0) is of type II (see Figures 6
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and 7) and the steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy is lower in the social optimum than in
open access. The evolution of the state paths have in common the ”overshooting” pattern
in the level of infection, which is stronger in the social optimum than in open access. This
means that although in both cases it will end up at the same steady-state level, for a good
part of the socially optimal trajectory the stock of infected population will be maintained
below the minimal level reached under open access. The level of antibiotic eﬃcacy decreases
in a monotone fashion in each case and it is always higher in open access than what it
would be in the social optimum for the same stock of infected population, except for a single
point where the two paths cross. This suggests that the socially optimal fraction of the
infected population treated at each instant will be greater than under open access, except
asymptotically as both tend to the same steady state value of Δr/rf . This is indeed veriﬁed
numerically, as shown in Figure 9b.
Similar numerical simulations with initial states of types I, III or IV and with wSS
∗
greater, smaller or equal to wSS yield, mutate mutandis, similar qualitative results.
7 Conclusion
We have modeled the level of eﬃcacy of an antibiotic in treating a bacterial infection as a
resource stock which is depleted by consumption of the antibiotic, as the bacteria become
resistant, but which may be renewed if managed properly. This has served as the basis for
analyzing the economic dynamics of the use of the antibiotic to treat a bacterial infection
under two scenarios. One is the market equilibrium in which antibiotic producers have open
access to the common pool of antibiotic eﬃcacy and enter until price is driven down to
average cost. They care only about their production cost and the determinants of current
demand for their product, which are its quality, as measured by the current level of eﬃcacy of
the antibiotic, and the current stock of infected population, but they ignore their individual
eﬀects on the evolution of those state variables. The other is the social optimum, which takes
into account, in addition to the surplus of the producers, the welfare of all the population,
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whether healthy or infected and, when infected, whether treated with the antibiotic or not.
It turns out that the comparison of the steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy under the
two scenarios is ambiguous. Consider a parameter conﬁguration such that the steady state
level of antibiotic eﬃcacy is less than one in both the open access equilibrium and the social
optimum. Then, whether the steady-state level of eﬃcacy in open-access equilibrium is lower
or higher than in the socially optimal steady-state will depend on the epidemiological and
the economic parameters. For instance, for a given cost of production of the antibiotic,
if the increase in the recovery rate that results from treating the infection is suﬃciently
high, then the socially optimal steady-state level of antibiotic eﬃcacy can be higher than
in the open-access equilibrium, but the reverse is true if the increase in the recovery rate is
suﬃciently low. In both cases, the steady-state stock of infected population and the steady-
state treatment rate will be the same in the open-access equilibrium as in the social optimum.
But the trajectories leading to those long-run steady-states will always diﬀer considerably.
There in fact exist some parameter conﬁgurations such that the steady state level of
eﬃcacy would be equal to one under open access while it would be less than one at the
social optimum. This will involve a unit cost of production which is relatively high and
hence a relatively low treatment rate under open access. Should the unit cost of production
exceed the improvement in the recovery rate that results from treatment, the open access
treatment rate would be zero in such an open-access steady state, since the ﬁrms would
ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to produce. The threshold cost level for social proﬁtability of treatment
is however higher than this, because, contrary to the ﬁrms under open access, the social
optimum takes into account the welfare of all the population, whether healthy or not, as well
as the epidemiological dynamics.
The open-access equilibrium and the social optimum are two benchmark cases. Pharma-
ceutical companies are usually given patent rights for the production of the drug they have
discovered in order to encourage research and development, with the result that they beneﬁt
from a monopoly situation for a ﬁnite period of time. The open-access scenario can be viewed
26
as a good approximation of the situation which arises after the expiration of the patent. An
obvious next step, which is the subject of ongoing research, is to analyze and compare to the
social optimum a situation where a producer has monopoly rights for a ﬁnite period of time
and becomes one of many producers in open access once those monopoly rights expire. The
analyses and comparisons carried out in this paper provide useful inputs for further research
in this direction. They should also have useful implications for the analysis of optimal poli-
cies towards antibiotic use in general, although, given the complicated dynamics involved
and the ambiguities encountered in comparing the two benchmark scenario, one can expect
the task to be arduous.
Appendix
We ﬁrst recall the full dynamic system, involving the state and co-state variables, which
the socially optimal solution must satisfy. It is given by:
w˙ = w(1− w)(Δr − rff) (A–1)
I˙ = I(β(N − I)− rr + w(Δr − rff)) (A–2)
μ˙ = ρμ +
1
2
ΔrI − rffI + 1
2
rff
2I − (Δr − rff)[μ(2w − 1)− λI] (A–3)
λ˙ = ρλ +
1
2
(1− π(w))− rfwf + 1
2
rfwf
2 + cf
−λ[β(N − 2I)− rr + w(Δr − rff)] (A–4)
In addition, the ﬁrst-order condition (26) for the maximization of the Hamiltonian must be
satisﬁed at every point in time, including at a steady state. A steady state solution is given
by w˙ = I˙ = μ˙ = λ˙ = 0.
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A The socially optimal steady state with wSS
∗
= 1
Setting w = 1 in (A–1), we have w˙ = 0. Setting I˙ = 0, λ˙ = 0 and w = 1 in (A–2) and (A–4)
gives:
I =
βN − rw − rff
β
(A–5)
λ =
f(rf − c)− 12rff 2 − 12(1− rw)
ρ + βI
(A–6)
For convenience, we rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition (26) as:
rfI(1− c
rf
− f − λ) + σ0 − σ1 = 0 (A–7)
where σ0 and σ1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints f ≥ 0 and f ≤ 1
respectively and
σ0f = 0, σ1(1− f) = 0, σ0 ≥ 0, σ1 ≥ 0.
Equation (A–5), (A–6) and (A–7) together determine ISS
∗
, λSS
∗
and fSS
∗
.
Setting f = 0, we ﬁnd:
σ0 = −rf (βN − rw)
β
(
1− c
rf
+
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
.
This expression is negative if c ≤ rf . This means that if c ≤ rf the treatment rate must
be positive, since σ0 must be non-negative. However if c > rf , then for c suﬃciently high
the expression in parentheses will be negative and σ0 will be positive, which means that the
optimal treatment rate is f = 0. In fact, we must have
f > 0 if c <
(
1 +
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
rf
and
f = 0 if c >
(
1 +
1− rw
2(βN − rw + ρ)
)
rf > rf
.
Setting f = 1, we ﬁnd:
σ1 = −βN − rw − rf
β
(
c +
1
2
rf − c− 12(1− rw)
βN − rw − rf + ρ rf
)
(A–8)
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Clearly there exist admissible values of the parameters for which σ1 ≥ 0 and f = 1 is a
solution.
An interior solution for f must satisfy (A–5), (A–6) and (A–7) with σ0 = σ1 = 0. It is
easy to verify numerically that there exist values of the parameters for which the solution
for f is interior.
We therefore conclude that fSS
∗
can take any value from zero to one, with the exact
value depending on the set of parameters.
B The socially optimal steady state with fSS
∗
= Δr
rf
For an interior solution to the maximization of the Hamiltonian, f must satisfy equation
(29), in addition to (A–1)-(A–4). Setting f = fSS
∗
= Δr/rf , we have w˙ = 0, from (A–1),
and from (A–2):
ISS
∗
=
βN − rr
β
. (A–9)
Setting μ˙ = 0 in (A–3) and substituting for fSS
∗
and ISS
∗
, we get the steady-state solution
for μ:
μSS
∗
=
Δr
2ρ
[
1− Δr
rf
] [
βN − rr
β
]
. (A–10)
We still need to determine the steady-state levels of antibiotic eﬃcacy, wSS
∗
, and of the
shadow cost of infection, λSS
∗
. Setting λ˙ = 0 in (A–4) and substituting for fSS
∗
and ISS
∗
we get:
λ =
1
2
(rr − 1)− crf
ρ + βN − rr +
1
2
Δr
[
1− Δr
rf
]
ρ + βN − rr w (A–11)
which is a positively-sloped straight line in (w, λ) space.
Substituting for fSS
∗
and ISS
∗
into (29), we get:
λ =
[
1− Δr
rf
](
1− Δr
2ρ
)
− c
rf
1
w
+
Δr
2ρ
[
1− Δr
rf
]
w (A–12)
which represents a hyperbola with a vertical asymptote at w = 0 and an oblique asymptote
with a positive slope. These two curves will intersect to the right of the vertical asymptote,
i.e. where w > 0. This is because the ratio of the slope of the oblique asymptote and the
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slope of (A–11) is (ρ + βN − rr)/ρ > 1 and the hyperbola (A–12) approaches its oblique
asymptote from below. The point of intersection yields wSS
∗
, which is given by:
wSS
∗
= − J
2H
+
√(
J
2H
)2
− K
H
(A–13)
where
H = (rf −Δr)Δr(rr − βN)
2ρ
J = (rf −Δr)(ρ + βN − rr)
(
Δr
2ρ
− 1
)
+
rf
2
(rr − 1)− cΔr
K = c(ρ + βN − rr).
Depending on the set of parameters we have wSS
∗
< 1 or wSS
∗
= 1. The analysis of the
parameter space concentrates on the space (rf , c) ∈ (Δr, βN−rw]×(0,∞). The lower bound
on rf guarantees that Δr/rf < 1, which implies that the level of antibiotic eﬃcacy decreases
if the whole infected population is treated. There exists an arbitrage between keeping the
level of eﬃcacy high and keeping that of infection low. The upper bound on rf guarantees
that the level of infection is non-negative at f = 1 in the steady state deﬁned by (7). The
admissible interval for c guarantees that the unit cost of production is positive, as assumed.
From (A–13) we ﬁnd that wSS
∗
= 1 implies:
c = c˜(rf ) =
Δr
[
Δr
2
− (βN − rr + ρ)
]
βN − rr + ρ−Δr +
(
βN − rr + ρ + 12 − 12(Δr + rr)
βN − rr + ρ−Δr
)
rf . (A–14)
This equation represents a straight line that divides the (rf , c)-space. Everything else equal,
for a small enough ﬁtness cost we have βN − rr +ρ−Δr > 0 and this line is then positively-
sloped and has a negative intercept. We then have wSS
∗
< 1 below the line and wSS
∗
= 1
above it.
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Figure 4a: Open-access dynamics with initial state of type I
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Figure 4b: Open-access dynamics with initial state of type II
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Figure 5a: Open-access dynamics with initial state of type III
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Figure 5b: Open-access dynamics with initial state of type IV
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Figure 6: Convergence to steady state under open access
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Figure 7: Convergence to steady state in the social optimum
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Figure 9a: Comparison of the socially optimal and open-access paths
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Figure 9b: Comparison of the socially optimal and open-access treatment rates
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